Naval War College Review
Volume 72
Number 4 Autumn 2019

Article 12

2019

Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental
Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern
World
Kevin D. McCranie
Andrew Lambert

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
McCranie, Kevin D. and Lambert, Andrew (2019) "Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That
Made the Modern World," Naval War College Review: Vol. 72 : No. 4 , Article 12.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss4/12

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

McCranie and Lambert: Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Co

BOOK REVIEWS

WARS, HISTORICAL AND AMBIGUOUS
Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern
World, by Andrew Lambert. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2018. 424 pages. $30.

The idea of seapower serves as the
foundational argument for Andrew
Lambert’s Seapower States. Lambert
does employ the more traditional
phrase sea power—but chiefly as a foil
to his ideas of seapower. Although
some might claim that the difference
between seapower and sea power is
merely an academic abstraction, or an
unnecessarily confusing construct, the
author crafts a convincing argument.
Lambert asserts that sea power is a
Mahanian formulation of hard power.
Any state can have the attributes of sea
power—it only requires a powerful navy.
This list of sea powers includes Rome,
the United States, and contemporary
China. What separates a state pursuing
sea power from one demonstrating
seapower is the relationship of the sea
to the state’s existence. Sea powers do
not need the sea to survive as great
powers. The military and economic
advantages of sea power are nice to
have, but the state does not live and
die by the sea. Such states often are
continental land powers first, and
their wealth, size, and influence leads
to naval—sea power—ambitions.
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Conversely, seapower reflects weakness. Without international commerce
and the moneys it generates, the
seapower state would cease to be a great
power. Various geographic, economic,
political, and cultural attributes allow
seapowers to punch well above their
weight. Lambert categorizes Athens,
Carthage, Venice, the Dutch Republic,
and Great Britain as seapowers. This
list is more restrictive than some; the
author deliberately excludes Portugal
and Spain, labeling them overseas
empires, since their colonial possessions
were a “useful adjunct to their core
concerns,” while Lambert labels others,
including Rhodes and Genoa, “sea
states,” because they are “too small to
aspire to great power status” (p. 204).
To understand the nature of seapower
states, Lambert asks readers to look
beyond hard power and strategy to the
very nature of society. Seapowers tend
toward more-inclusive political systems,
usually oligarchic republics; absolute
rule is an anathema. Economically, they
depend on maritime commerce not only
for wealth but for the very resources
needed to survive—often these states
are not agriculturally self-sufficient.
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Commerce brings cultural exchange.
Art and architecture reflect the sea and
its significance to society. Yet although
Lambert tries hard to focus on the cultural aspects of seapower, he has trouble
defining culture. Too often, his cultural
arguments drift into economic and
hard-power factors, for these allowed
seapowers to exert disproportionate
influence on the international system.
Seapowers have sought great-power status, but Lambert claims they have been
limited in the courses of action available
to them. They must play to their naval
and economic strengths while avoiding
land campaigns that are beyond their
ability to sustain. They have neither
the population to field large armies
nor economies capable of sustaining
large armies and navies simultaneously.
Instead, seapower states prove most
effective at fighting protracted naval
wars for limited objectives, building
wealth, and avoiding overextension.
Although they possess great wealth
and powerful navies, seapowers are
fragile—continental entanglements can
spell disaster. In the case of the Dutch,
landward threats proved inescapable,
and Venice was weakened by terrestrial distractions. Britain’s continental
commitment in World War I “shattered
the British seapower state” (p. 302).
Lambert claims that Britain was both
the greatest and the last of these states.
Because of the twentieth-century world
wars, Britain passed the mantle of global
maritime dominance not to a seapower
but to a sea power—the United States.
It is important to grasp what this book
is—and more particularly what it is not.
We should not consider this definitive
history, for there is much with which
to quibble. Lambert’s evidence and
interpretations are deliberately selective.
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Although some may consider this a
weakness, understanding this mitigates
the issue and allows the reader to focus
on Lambert’s compelling interpretations.
The book’s primary value becomes its
argument about what the sea means
to different states, by highlighting
competing worldviews. Lambert claims
that seapower states are inclusive
and dynamic, while the great powers
that have destroyed them often were
“terrified” by what seapowers stood for.
Although Lambert writes from his
own (British) perspective and reflects
particularly on what he considers to
have been the last and greatest of the
seapower states, his argument has
noteworthy contemporary application.
He forces the reader to ponder the sea’s
significance to contemporary China
and the United States. Lambert claims
both are continental powers. The sea
is not integral for either in the manner
that it was for seapower states; rather,
the ocean becomes a frontier to be
defended and exploited. The argument
has substantial implications when
understanding national objectives,
strategy, and long-term sustainability.
Lambert’s argument certainly should
spur controversy, for the author builds,
through a series of carefully constructed
arguments and case studies, a thesis that
questions the nature of the international
maritime environment of the future.
KEVIN D. MCCRANIE

War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, by
David Patrikarakos. New York: Basic Books,
2017. 320 pages. $17.99.

Social media has deployed far-reaching
global communication abilities,
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